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Pecking Order Theory Versus Trade-Off Theory: Are Service SMEs’ 
Capital Structure Decisions Different? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the context of firms’ financing decisions, after the important contributions by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), various studies were devoted to investigating what 
the main determinants of firms’ capital structure were. In this connection, two theories 
are particularly relevant in explaining firms’ capital structure: i) Trade-Off Theory 
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1977; Kim, 1978); and ii) Pecking Order Theory 
(Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). According to Trade-Off Theory, firms seek to 
achieve the target debt ratio that corresponds to the point where the marginal benefits 
equal the marginal costs of debt. According to Pecking Order Theory, variations in debt 
do not are not motivated by the wish to achieve the target debt ratio, but are the 
consequence of the accumulated funding needs that are not covered by internal finance, 
and in this situation firms prefer to turn to debt rather than external equity. According to 
these two main theories, capital structure decisions are influenced by several firm 
characteristics, namely: profitability, size, age, growth opportunities, risk, asset 
structure, non-debt tax shields, and others. Pecking Order and Trade-off theories do not 
converge regarding the influence of these determinants on capital structure decisions. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), mainly smaller and younger firms 
with growth opportunities that are associated with high risk, are known to have 
difficulty in obtaining external finance. Size and tangible assets can be particularly 
important for SMEs with insufficient internal finance to be able to obtain debt on more 
advantageous terms to fund the multiple investment opportunities.  
3 
 
Service SMEs have peculiar characteristics that may justify the differences in their 
capital structure decisions in comparison to those taken by other types of firm. Indeed, 
smaller size together with lower level of tangible assets may aggravate the problems of 
information asymmetry between service SME owners/managers and creditors, leading 
creditors to impose particularly adverse conditions for these firms to obtain debt.  
The service industry sector is especially important in the European economy in 
general, and in peripheral economies such as Portugal in particular. In this context, the 
service industry sector is especially important for economic and employment growth in 
Portugal. SMEs account for 99.68% of all firms in Portugal (INE, 2010). Among 
Portuguese SMEs, service SMEs are particularly important. Between 2000 and 2005, 
with respect to SMEs in the service industry, growth in the number of firms was found 
to be the 10.1%, employment growth was 8.6%, and growth of business turnover was 
7.3%. In comparison, concerning SMEs in manufacturing industry, growth in the 
number of firms was found to be 4.5%, employment fell by 0.2%, and business turnover 
fell by 0.3%. 
Given the considerable importance of service SMEs in the Portuguese economy, it is 
particularly relevant to study how information asymmetry between these firms and 
creditors, influences their capital structure decisions, making service SMEs a special 
case regarding financing strategies, compared to what occurs in other types of firms. 
Therefore, this paper seeks to analyse if the capital structure decisions of service small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are different from those of other types of firm 
To reach the goal of this study, we use four research samples: i) 610 service SMEs; 
ii) 126 large service firms; iii) 679 SMEs in manufacturing and construction industries; 
and iv) 132 large firms in manufacturing and construction industries. In this way, we 
compare the results obtained for service SMEs with those for larger firms with higher 
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level of tangible assets to analyse the possible influence of problems of information 
asymmetry in relationships between service SME owners/managers and creditors on the 
financing decisions of service SMEs, compared to what occurs in other types of firm. 
Methodologically, so as to avoid possible result bias due to the matter of survival, we 
use the two-step estimation method proposed by Heckman (1979). In the first step, we 
use probit regressions, considering all service SMEs and other types of firm. In the 
second step, after calculating the inverse Mill´s ratio, and including it in the regressions, 
considering surviving service SMEs and other surviving firms, we estimate the 
regressions with respect to the applicability of Pecking Order Theory and Trade-Off 
Theory to the capital structure decisions of service SMEs and other types of firm. 
This paper has various original contributions regarding the state-of-the-art of the 
literature on SME capital structure in general, and the capital structure of service SMEs 
in particular. Firstly, it is pioneering in studying specifically the applicability of 
representative models of Pecking Order Theory and Trade-Off Theory to the capital 
structure decisions of service SMEs. Secondly, it is pioneering in comparing the 
applicability of representative models of Pecking Order Theory and Trade-Off Theory 
between the situation of service SMEs and that of other types of firm, namely large 
service firms, manufacturing and construction SMEs and large manufacturing and 
construction firms. Thirdly, the study is pioneering in applying the two-step estimation 
method to the capital structure decisions of service SMEs, and comparing them with the 
capital structure decisions of other types of firm.  
The multiple empirical evidence presented in this paper allow us to draw a 
particularly important conclusion for managers, practitioners and academics: the capital 
structure decisions of service SMEs are considerably different from those of other types 
of firm, such as large service firms, and SMEs and large firms in manufacturing and 
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construction industries. Decisive for this result could be the combination of smaller size 
and lower level of tangible assets that particularly affect service SMEs, compared to 
other types of firm.  
After this introduction, this paper has the following structure: i) Section 2. 
Methodology and Research Hypotheses, presents the models to estimate, the variables 
used and corresponding measures, the estimation method and research hypotheses; ii) 
Section 3. Database and Descriptive Statistics, presents the database used and the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study; iii) Section 4. Results, presents 
the empirical evidence obtained in the study; iv) Section 5. Discussion of the Results, 
goes on to discuss the empirical evidence obtained; and v) finally, Section 6. 
Conclusions and Implications, presents the main conclusions and implications of the 
study. 
 
2. Methodology and Research Hypotheses  
In this section we present the models used to test the applicability of Pecking Order and 
Trade-Off theories to the capital structure decisions of service SMEs and other types of 
firm. Initially, we present the models to estimate together with the variables used and 
their corresponding measures, and after this we present the research hypotheses.  
 
2.1. Pecking Order Theory 
 
Relationship between Financial Deficit and Debt – POT Model I 
Firstly, to test Pecking Order Theory, we use the model proposed by Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999). This model consists of testing a regression between financial deficit and 
variations in debt.  
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To solve the problem of possible bias in the results due to the survival issue, we use 
the two-step estimation method proposed by Heckman (1979). In the first step, we 
estimate a probit regression, taking all surviving and non-surviving firms, considering 
all explanatory variables corresponding to the regressions to estimate in the second step. 
Therefore, the regressions to estimate can be presented as follows: 
tittiti zdFD ,,0, )1Pr(   ,       (1) 
where: )1Pr( , ti  is survival probability;   is the parameter to measure the impact of 
financial deficit on survival probability, tiFD ,  is financial deficit, td  represents 
temporal dummies, and tiz ,  is the error term.  
In the second step of estimation, we consider the inverse Mill´s ratio
2
, as an 
explanatory variable for service SMEs and other types of firm. According to Pecking 
Order Theory, variations in debt occur exclusively as a function of firms’ financing 
needs. We extend the model proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), including 
the inverse Mill´s ratio in regressions as an explanatory variable, so as to solve the 
problem of possible result bias as a consequence of the survival issue. Therefore, the 
regressions to estimate can be presented as follows: 
tittititi dBFDD ,,,0,          (2) 
 
where tiD ,  is the difference between debt in the current period and debt in the previous 
period , B  is the parameter to measure the impact of financial deficit on debt variations, 
                                                 
2
 The inverse Mill´s ratio is the ratio between cumulative density function and the density function. The 
designation of inverse Mill´s ratio is due to the fact that Mill´s ratio considers the inverse of Hazard ratio 
(also known as force of mortality). For a detailed description of calculation of the inverse Mill´s ratio, see 
Heckman (1979).  
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ti ,  is the inverse Mill’s ratio, td  represents temporal dummies, and ti ,  is the error that 
is assumed to have normal distribution.  
To estimate equation (2), we turn to OLS regressions for two fundamental reasons: 
i) the non-existence of the lagged dependent variable in the relationship forecast by 
equation (2) makes use of dynamic estimators impossible; and ii) since the dependent 
variable is in first differences, non-observable individual effects ( iv ) become irrelevant, 
and it is no impossible to estimate the relationship forecast in equation (2) with panel 
models considering random or fixed non-observable individual effects.  
Given that heteroskedasticity is normally a relevant phenomenon in empirical 
studies that use cross-section data, standard deviations of the parameters are estimated 
according to the White estimator. This estimator allows us to obtain standard deviations 
of estimated parameters consistent with the possible existence of heteroskedasticity. 
  
Determinants of Debt – POT Model II 
Following other studies (Michaellas et al., 1999; Aybar et al., 2004
3
 ; López-Gracia and 
Sánchez-Andújar, 2007; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008), we test the Pecking 
Order Theory, on the basis of a second regression model, considering the determinants 
of debt according to what is predicted by Pecking Order Theory: i) cash flow; ii) age; 
and iii) interaction between cash flow and growth opportunities.  
As in Model I, in the first step we estimate probit regressions in order to estimate the 
inverse Mill´s ratio. The regressions to estimate can be presented as follows: 
tit
tititititi
zd
LGOHHCFHGOLCFAGECF
,
,4,3,2,10, )1Pr(

 
 (3) 
 
                                                 
3
 Aybar Arias, C., Casino Martínez, A. and López Gracia, J. (2004). Efectos Financieros y Estratégicos 
sobre la Estructura de Capital de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa. Moneda y Crédito, 58, 71-98. 
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in which: tiCF ,  corresponds to cash flow, given by the ratio of earnings after interest 
and taxes plus depreciation to total assets; tiAGE , , is age, given by the number of years 
the firm has been in existence; tiHGOLCF, , are the growth opportunities of firms (i), at 
a given moment (t), corresponding to situations of high growth opportunities and low 
cash flow; tiLGOHCF, , are the growth opportunities of firm (i), at a given moment (t), 
corresponding to situations of low growth opportunities and high cash flow.  
To calculate tiHGOLCF,  we consider initially a dummy variable with the value of 1 
corresponding to firms that, at a given moment, have simultaneously growth 
opportunities above the median of growth opportunities of the total sample and cash 
flow under the median of cash flow of the total sample; and the value of 0 in the 
remaining situations. To calculate tiLGOHCF,  we consider, initially, a dummy variable 
with the value of 1 when firms, at a given time, have simultaneously growth 
opportunities under the median of growth opportunities of the total sample and cash 
flow above the median of cash flow of the total sample; and the value of 0 in the 
remaining situations. Finally, to calculate the variables tiHGOLCF,  and tiLGOHCF, , we 
multiply the previously calculated dummy variables by sales growth (considered as a 
measure of growth opportunities).  
In the second step, to estimate the relationships forecast by Pecking Order Theory 
between determinants and debt, for service SMEs and other types of firm, we use static 
panel models. The regressions to estimate can be presented as follows: 
tititi
tititititi
du
LGOHCFHGOLCFAGECFD
,,
,4,3,2,10,


 

,    (4) 
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in which: tiD ,  corresponds to debt, given by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
and iu  are firms’ specific factors that are not directly observable from debt 
determinants. 
We use the LM test in order to verify if non-observable individual effects (ui) are 
relevant in explaining debt. The null hypothesis indicates the irrelevance of non-
observable individual effects, against the alternative hypothesis of relevance of non-
observable individual effects. In the case of rejecting the null hypothesis, due to the 
relevance of non-observable individual effects in explaining debt, an OLS regression is 
not the most appropriate way to estimate the relationships between determinants and 
debt. If non-observable individual effects are relevant in explaining debt, we also use 
the Hausman test to check whether non-observable individual effects are correlated with 
the independent variables. The null hypothesis indicates the non-existence of correlation 
between non-observable individual effects and the independent variables, against the 
alternative hypothesis that non-observable individual effects are correlated with the 
dependent variable. By not rejecting the null hypothesis, non-observable individual 
effects are not correlated with the independent variables, and so it makes no difference 
estimating relationships between determinants and debt with a random or fixed effect 
panel model. In the case of rejecting the null hypothesis, there is correlation between 
non-observable individual effects and the independent variables, and so the 
relationships between determinants and debt should be estimated using a fixed effect 
model.  
This paper presents the results of the LM and Hausman tests for the different types 
of firms considered, and the most suitable model for estimating results with respect to to 
relationships between determinants and debt for the different types of firms considered.  
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Research Hypothesis 
According to Pecking Order Theory, variations in debt occur exclusively as a function 
of firms’ financing needs, i.e., debt variations are a function of the financial deficit 
found at a given time (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). In addition, according to 
Pecking Order Theory, we can also expect that: i) firms with greater cash flow resort 
less to debt (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984); ii) older firms resort less to debt 
(Diamond, 1989; Ang, 1991); iii) firms with greater growth opportunities and low cash 
flow resort more to debt (Myers, 1984); and iv) firms with low growth opportunities and 
high cash flow resort less to debt (Myers, 1984).  
In the SME context, various studies point toward firms preferring to fund themselves 
through retained profits, or else through recourse to the savings of family or friends 
(Pettit and Singer, 1985; Ang 1992; Scherr and Hulburt 2001; López-Gracia and 
Sánchez-Andújar, 2008; Ramalho and Silva 2009). SME preference for retained profits 
is related to the particular difficulties faced by SMEs in obtaining external finance, due 
to their greater likelihood of bankruptcy (Pettit and Singer, 1985; Ang, 1991). Indeed, 
Franco and Haase (2010) conclude that financing restrictions are one of the main 
problems affecting these firms’ survival in their operating markets.  
Cruz-Ros et al. (2010) conclude that intangible assets are particularly relevant for 
increased performance in service firms. However, the authors conclude that service firm 
activities based on intangible assets may contribute to these firms having greater 
difficulty in obtaining debt. According to Cressy and Olofsson (1997) and Abor (2007), 
for SMEs with higher level of tangible assets it is easier to obtain debt than for SMEs 
whose activities are based predominantly on intangible assets. For Cressy and Olofsson 
(1997), greater intangibility of assets in service firms in general, and service SMEs in 
particular, contributes decisively to these firms to have greater difficulty in obtaining 
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debt than may be the case of firms belonging to other sectors of activity where tangible 
assets are more important. 
Service SMEs may be particularly dependent on internal finance to fund their 
multiple growth opportunities. Smaller size, associated with the importance of 
intangible activities in these firms’ activities, and consequently lower capacity in 
providing tangible assets security on debt may aggravate the problems of information 
asymmetry. Therefore, creditors may hinder service SMEs’ access to debt. When 
internal finance is insufficient, service SMEs’ particular difficulty in obtaining external 
funding may prevent these firms from taking advantage of the multiple opportunities 
available to this type of firm. The majority of service SMEs do not fulfill the 
requirements to be listed in the stock market, and when firms have little tradition of 
using venture capital, as occurs in peripheral economies like Portugal, SMEs are 
restrained in using alternative funding sources to internal finance.  
Based on the above arguments, we can expect that: i) the impact of financial deficit 
on variations of debt is of a greater magnitude for service SMEs than for other types of 
firm; ii) as a function of cash flow, age, low growth opportunities and high cash flow, 
service SMEs turn less to debt than other types of firms,; and iii) in situations of high 
growth opportunities and low cash flow, service SMEs turn less to debt than other types 
of firm. Therefore, we formulate the following research hypothesis: 
H1: The capital structure decisions of service SMEs are closer to what is forecast by 
Pecking Order Theory than the capital structure decisions of other types of firm.   
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2.2. Trade-Off Theory 
 
Adjustment of Actual Level of Debt toward Target Debt Ratio and Debt Determinants 
We present the partial adjustment that allows us to test the degree of adjustment of 
actual debt toward target debt ratio, and the relationships between debt and determinants 
forecast by Trade-Off Theory. Firstly, we estimate probit regressions, considering as 
explanatory variables the determinants of debt according to Trade-Off Theory. The 
regressions to estimate can be presented as follows: 
titStiti
tititititi
zdDEVOLETRNDTS
GOTANGSIZEPROF
,7,6,5
,4,3,2,10, )1Pr(




,  (5) 
 
 in which: profitability ( tiPROF , ) is given by the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets; size ( tiSIZE , ) is the natural logarithm of total assets; asset 
tangibility ( tiTANG , ) is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets; growth opportunities 
( tiGO , ) is the growth of total assets; non-debt tax shields ( tiNDTS , ) is the ratio of 
depreciations and amortizations to total assets; effective tax rate ( tiETR , ) is the ratio of 
actual income tax paid to net taxable income before taxes; level of risk ( tiEVOL , ) is the 
absolute value of the first difference of percentage change of earnings before interest, 
taxes and depreciation.  
In the second step of estimation, we estimate the adjustment of the actual debt level 
in service SMEs and other types of firm, toward respective target debt ratios, as well as 
the relationships between determinants and debt forecast by Trade-Off Theory, using 
the GMM system (1998) dynamic estimator. To do so, just as López-Gracia and 
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Sánchez-Andujar (2007) and López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008), we use the partial 
adjustment model, which is given by:  
)*( 1,,1,,   titititi DDDD  ,        (6) 
 
in which: 1, tiD  is the debt of firm i in the period t-1; *,tiD  is the target debt ratio of 
firm i in period t, and   is the speed of adjustment of actual level of debt toward target 
debt ratio.   
To estimate the above equation it is necessary to find the target debt ratio that is not 
directly observable. In this study we consider just as López-Gracia and Sánchez-
Andújar (2007) and López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008), that target debt ratio 
depends on firms’ specific characteristics. Therefore, firms’ target debt ratio is given by:  



n
K
tiitStitikKti vudDZD
1
,,,,, *   ,     (7) 
 
in which tiKZ ,,  is the determinant k of the debt of firm i at time t, K  are the 
coefficients of each debt determinant and tiv ,  is the error term.  
Substituting (7) in (6) and regrouping the terms, we have: 


 
n
K
tititikKtiti ZDD
1
,,,1,0,  ,       (8) 
in which: )1(0   , KK   , ii u  , tt d  , and titi v ,,   .  
To estimate the equation (8) on the basis of traditional panel methods, considering 
fixed or random individual effects, we obtain biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters, given that, asides from the existence of correlation between i  and 1, tiD , 
there is also correlation between ti ,  and 1, tiD , i.e., firms’ non-observable individual 
effects and the error are correlated with the lagged debt. In addition, use of dynamic 
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estimators rather than use of traditional panel methods has the following extra 
advantages: i) greater control of endogeneity; ii) greater control of possible collinearity 
between explanatory variables; and iii) greater effectiveness in controlling effects 
caused by the absence of relevant explanatory variables for the results.  
This study uses the Generalized Moments Method – GMM system (1998) estimator 
by Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate the model of partial adjustment. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) conclude that when the dependent variable is persistent, the GMM system 
(1998) estimator is more robust than the Generalized Moments Method – GMM (1991) 
estimator
4
. Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the GMM (1991) estimator, considering a 
system of variables at level and in first differences. For the variables at level the 
instruments are presented in first differences, and for the variables in first differences 
the instruments are presented at level.  
Nevertheless, the GMM system (1998) estimator can only be considered valid if: i) 
the restrictions, a consequence of use of the instruments, are valid; and ii) there is no 
second-order autocorrelation.   
To test the validity of the restrictions, we use the Hansen test. The null hypothesis 
indicates that the restrictions, imposed by use of the instruments, are valid. By rejecting 
the null hypothesis, we conclude that the restrictions are not valid, and so the results are 
not robust. We test for the existence of first and second-order autocorrelation. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation. Rejecting the null hypothesis of non-
existence of second-order autocorrelation, we conclude that the results are not robust. 
For the results of the GMM system (1998) estimator to be considered robust, the 
                                                 
4
 In this study, we find persistence of debt for service SMEs and other types of firms. The correlation 
coefficient of present debt and previous debt is 0.81991 in service SMEs, 0.84513 in large service firms, 
0.82737 in other SMEs, and 0.85616 in other large firms. Therefore, it is clearly advisable to use the 
GMM system (1998) estimator, rather than the GMM (1991) estimator.   
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restrictions imposed by use of the instruments have to be valid and there can be no 
second-order autocorrelation.  
To test the robustness of the empirical evidence obtained, we use the LSDVC 
(2005) estimator, proposed by Bruno (2005). The LSDVC (2005) estimator is 
appropriate in situations without a great number of observations. If the number of cross-
sections is below 30, it is recommendable to use the LSDVC (2005) estimator to test the 
robustness of the results obtained with the GMM system (1998) estimator. The results 
are presented in an appendix.  
 
Research Hypothesis 
According to Trade-Off Theory, firms adjust the actual debt level toward a target debt 
ratio (Lev and Pekelman, 1975; Ang, 1976; Taggart, 1977; Jalilvand and Harris, 1984). 
Lower transaction costs borne by firms in obtaining debt will correspond to greater 
adjustment of the actual debt level toward the target debt ratio. Also according to Trade-
Off Theory, we can expect that: i) firms with level of profitability turn more to debt 
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Scott, 1977; Kim, 1978); ii) larger firms turn more to 
debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995); iii) firms with more tangible assets turn more to debt 
(Myers, 1977; Scott, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991); iv) firms 
with greater growth opportunities turn less to debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 
1977; Stulz, 1990; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Barclay et al., 2006); v) firms with 
greater non-debt tax shields turn less to debt (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980); vi) firms 
with higher effective tax rates turn more to debt (Haugen and Senbet, 1986; Scott, 1976; 
DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980); and vii) firms with greater risk turn less to debt (Bradley 
et al., 1984; Mackie-Mason, 1990). 
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Service SMEs can be particularly affected by problems of information asymmetry in 
the relationships between owners/managers and creditors. Service SME special 
characteristics, such as higher levels of intangible assets, and consequently lower level 
of tangible assets may lead lenders to make credit difficult. Furthermore, SMEs’ smaller 
size and consequently higher level of risk and probability of bankruptcy may lead 
creditors to associate this type of firm with high risk, and consequently make terms of 
credit difficult. 
Small firms are known to have a high business risk associated with their activities, 
and high bankruptcy costs, which may imply high transaction costs in obtaining debt 
(Revest and Sapio, 2010).   
Due to the high information asymmetry in relationships between the 
owners/managers of service SMEs and creditors, these firms may find it particularly 
difficult to obtain debt, compared to other types of firms. Indeed, firstly the greater size 
of large service firms may contribute to reducing the information asymmetry implicit in 
the relationships established with creditors, contributing to debt being obtained on more 
advantageous terms. Secondly, in general, the higher level of tangible assets in firms in 
other industries, namely those belonging to the manufacturing and construction 
industries implies that their risk default become lower. Therefore, it is easier for firms 
belonging to the manufacturing and construction industries to obtain debt. For example, 
large firms in the manufacturing and construction industries might find much easier to 
obtain debt, due to their greater size together with higher level of tangible assets, than 
service SMEs.  
Elston and Audretsch (2009) state that recourse to debt on particularly adverse terms 
imposed by creditors can harm firm’s profitability, therefore contributing to diminished 
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probability of survival. Therefore, firms that face particularly harsh credit terms may 
choose debt only in cases of extreme fund needs.  
The greater information asymmetry associated with relationships between service 
SME owners/managers and creditors, and consequently higher transaction costs for this 
type of firm, may lead service SMEs to consider the reaching of the target debt ratio as a 
merely secondary objective. 
Firms with greater size (Pettit and Singer, 1985; Ang, 1991), and/or with higher level 
of tangible assets (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Abor, 2007), consequently with less 
problems of information asymmetry, may have lower transaction costs associated with 
debt. Consequently, greater firms and firms with greater level of tangible assets can 
choose strategies more oriented to the long-term, i.e., more directed toward increasing 
firm value rather than using external finance only to cover insufficiencies of internal 
finance. 
On the basis of the above exposition, we can expect that the financing behavior of 
service SMEs is further removed from the assumptions of Trade-Off Theory as other 
types of firm, and so we can expect that: i) service SMEs have a lower speed of 
adjustment of the actual level of debt toward target debt ratio than do the other types of 
firm; ii) service SMEs resort less to debt as a function of profitability, size, tangible 
assets, and effective tax rate than do the other types of firm; and iii) service SMEs resort 
more to debt as a function of growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields and risk, 
compared to the other types of firm. Based on the above, we formulate the following 
research hypothesis: 
H2: The capital structure decisions of service SMEs are further removed from the 
forecasts of Trade-Off Theory than do the capital structure decisions of other types of 
firms. 
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3. Database and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1. Database 
This study uses the SABI (Analysis System of Iberian Balance Sheets) database, 
supplied by Bureau van Dijk for the period between 1999 and 2006. The selection of 
firms by industry sector was done in accordance with the NACE (Classification of 
Economic Activities in the European Union) classification
5
. We select SMEs based on 
the European Union recommendation L124/36 (2003/361/CE). According to this 
recommendation, a firm is considered an SME when it meets two of the following 
criteria: i) fewer than 250 employees; ii) total assets under 43 million euros; and iii) 
turnover under 50 million euros. Firms that do not meet these criteria are considered 
large firms.  
To solve the problem of possible result bias due to the matter of the survival effect, 
and also seeking to have a more representative sample of the Portuguese firms, we 
consider three types of firm: i) firms belonging to the market for the whole period of 
analysis (1999-2006); ii) firms entering the market during the period of analysis (1999-
2006); and iii) firms leaving the market during the period of analysis (1999-2006).  
Given the use of dynamic panel estimators, there are restrictions in including firms 
that are in the sample for a very limited number of years. According to Arellano and 
Bond (1991), firms must be present in the database for at least four consecutive years to 
be considered in the econometric analysis and in the second-order autocorrelation tests 
                                                 
5
 Services include: Real Estate Activities; Renting of Machinery and Equipment without Operator and 
Personal and Household Goods; Computer and Related Activities; and Other Business Activities. Other 
firms include: Manufacture of food products; Manufacture of textiles; Manufacture of wood and paper-
related products; Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; Manufacture of basic metals; 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment; and Construction.  
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that are essential to validate the robustness of the results. Thus, in selecting service 
SMEs and other types of firms we consider, besides the criteria stated above, their 
inclusion in the samples for at least four consecutive years.  
Based on the above criteria, we obtain four research samples with the following 
composition: i) sample of 610 service SMEs, of which 468 are in the market for the 
whole period of analysis, 66 enter the market during the period of analysis, and 76 leave 
the market during the period of analysis; ii) sample of 126 large service firms, of which 
112 are in the market for the whole period of analysis, 4 enter the market during the 
period of analysis, and 10 leave the market during the period of analysis; iii) sample of 
679 SMEs in manufacturing and construction industry sector, of which 506 are in the 
market for the whole period of analysis, 61 enter the market during the period of 
analysis, and 112 leave the market during the period of analysis; and iv) sample of 132 
large manufacturing and construction firms, of which 107 are in the market for the 
whole period of analysis, 6 leave the market during the period of analysis, and 19 enter 
the market during the period of analysis. 
The structure of the samples used in the paper is presented in Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1 About Here) 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics   
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study concerning 
service SMEs and other types of firm
6
. 
(Insert Table 2 About Here) 
                                                 
6
 For service SMEs, the median of cash flow is 0.067818, being 0.07231 for large service firms, 0.05018 
for other SMEs, and 0.06661 for other large firms. The median of growth opportunities is 0.08516 for 
service SMEs, being 0.04561 for large service firms, 0.07918 for other SMEs, and 0.04019 for other large 
firms. 
The median values of the cash flow and growth opportunities variables used for calculating the HGOLCF 
and LGOHCF variables are calculated according to what is presented in section 3. Methodology and 
Research Hypotheses.  
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It stands out that service SMEs, compared to what occurs in other types of firm, have 
on average: i) greater growth opportunities and greater risk; and ii) less variation of 
debt, less debt, lower age, lower level of tangible assets and lower non-debt tax shields.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Pecking Order Theory 
 
Relationship between Financial Deficit and Debt – POT Model I 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the survival analysis referring to Model I of Pecking 
Order Theory. 
(Insert Table 3 About Here) 
 
We find that financial deficit contributes to diminished probability of survival in 
service SMEs, which does not occur with respect to other types of firm. This result 
reveals the particular importance that financing restrictions may have for service SMEs, 
particularly for their survival.  
The following tables present the results of the tests of Pecking Order Theory, 
regarding Model I.  
(Insert Table 4 About Here) 
(Insert Table 5 About Here) 
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A positive relationship is found between financial deficit and debt variations in 
service SMEs and in the other types of firm considered. However, we find that the 
coefficient estimated that measures the relationship between financial deficit and debt 
variations is considerably higher in service SMEs than in other types of firm. The 
results of the Chow test confirm this, rejecting in all circumstances the null hypothesis 
of equality of the estimated parameters measuring relationships between financial 
deficit and debt variations in service SMEs and other types of firms. 
Additionally, we find that the regression constant is not significant when the subject 
of analysis is service SMEs, but it is significant in the case of other types of firm. This 
result reinforces the idea of the particular importance of financial deficit in explaining 
variations of the debt of service SMEs, compared to the situation of other types of firm. 
In all regressions, the statistically significant relationship between the inverse Mill´s 
ratio and variations in debt allows us to conclude that the inclusion of the inverse Mill´s 
ratio in regressions was effective in controlling for possible bias in the results estimated.  
 
Determinants of Debt – POT Model II 
Table 6 presents the results of the survival analysis regarding Model II of Pecking Order 
Theory. 
(Insert Table 6 About Here) 
 
The results suggest that cash flow is important for the survival of service SMEs and 
other types of firm. However, the magnitude of the estimated parameters indicates that 
the importance of cash flows greater for service SMEs than for other types of firm. In 
addition, age seems to be important for the survival of service SMEs, and large service 
firms as well as for the survival of manufacturing and construction SMEs. Considering 
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the magnitude of the estimated parameters, the importance of age seems to be greater 
for the survival of service SMEs. 
The following tables present the results of the tests of Pecking Order Theory, 
concerning Model II. 
(Insert Table 7 About Here) 
(Insert Table 8 About Here) 
 
In all of the regressions estimated, the results of the LM test indicate the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of irrelevance of non-observable individual effects. Therefore, an 
OLS regression is not the most appropriate way to estimate the relationships between 
determinants and debt in service SMEs and other types of firm. Additionally, the results 
of the Hausman test indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of absence of 
correlation between non-observable individual effects and explanatory variables, and so 
nor is a regression considering random non-observable individual effects a suitable way 
to estimate the relationships between determinants and debt in service SMEs and other 
types of firm. This being so, the most correct way to estimate the relationships between 
determinants and debt in service SMEs and other types of firm is to consider fixed non-
observable individual effects in the regressions. 
For service SMEs, we find that: i) greater cash flow, greater age and situations of low 
growth opportunities and high cash flow contribute to reduced debt; and ii) situations of 
high growth opportunities and low cash flow contribute to increased debt. For the 
remaining types of firm, cash flow is also found to contribute to reduced debt, the same 
is verified with respect to age for large service firms as well as for manufacturing and 
construction SMEs
7
. We also find that situations of high growth opportunities and low 
                                                 
7
 Although in this case the relationship is only statistically significant at 10% level. 
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cash flow contribute to increased debt in large service firms as well as in manufacturing 
and construction SMEs, whereas situations of low growth opportunities and high cash 
flow contribute to reduced debt in manufacturing and construction SMEs. The results of 
the Chow test indicate that for all determinants, the null hypothesis of equality of 
estimated parameters is rejected. The result of the Chow test of parameters as a whole 
confirms those differences. In all regressions estimated, a statistically significant 
relationship is found between the inverse Mill´s ratio and debt. We can therefore 
conclude that the inclusion of the inverse Mill´s ratio in regressions was shown to be 
effective in solving possible bias in the results obtained.  
 
4.2. Trade-Off Theory 
Table 9 presents the results of the survival analysis regarding the Trade-Off Theory 
model.  
(Insert Table 9 About Here) 
 
From the results presented in Table 9 and considering the magnitude of the estimated 
parameters, we highlight the following: i) profitability is particularly important for the 
survival of service SMEs, risk being particularly important for diminished survival of 
this type of firm; and ii) size and tangible assets are particularly important for the 
survival of SMEs, and large firms belonging to the manufacturing and construction 
industries.  
Tables 10 and 11 present the results of the tests of Trade-Off Theory.  
(Insert Table 10 About Here) 
(Insert Table 11 About Here) 
 
24 
 
Regardless of taking service SMEs or other types of firm as the subject of analysis, 
the results of the Hausman test indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
validity of the instruments used. In addition, the results of the second-order 
autocorrelation tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of 
autocorrelation. Based on the results of the Hansen and second-order autocorrelation 
tests, we can consider the results obtained with the GMM system (1998) estimator as 
valid, and consequently open to interpretation.  
We find that service SMEs: i) adjust actual debt toward target debt ratio; ii) reduce 
the level of debt as a function of greater profitability; and iii) reduce the level of debt as 
a function of greater size and higher levels of tangible assets. As for other types of firm, 
we find that: i) they adjust actual debt toward target debt ratio, ii) reduce the level of  
debt as a function of greater profitability as well as of greater non-debt tax shields, 
while they increase the level of debt as a function of higher level of tangible assets debt; 
iii) manufacturing and construction SMEs increase the level of debt as a function of  
greater size iv) manufacturing and construction SMEs and large firms reduce the level 
of debt as a function of greater growth opportunities; v) large service firms as well as 
manufacturing and construction large firms increase the level of debt as a function of 
higher effective tax rates; and vi) manufacturing and construction SMEs and large firms 
diminish the level of debt as a function of greater risk. 
Regarding the regressions presented in Table 10, but using the LSDVC (2005) 
estimator, the results presented in appendix are relatively similar to those presented in 
Table 10, with respect to sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated 
parameters, which confirms the robustness of the results presented. The results of the 
Chow test indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of equality of estimated 
parameters, except for the determinants of growth opportunities and risk in comparing 
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service SMEs and large service firms, and those of growth opportunities and effective 
tax rate in comparing service SMEs, and manufacturing and construction SMEs. The 
result of the Chow test of estimated parameters as a whole confirms that there are 
significant differences in the determinants of debt in service SMEs and other types of 
firm. 
Inclusion of the inverse Mill´s ratio in the regressions was also found to be effective 
in controlling for possible bias in the estimated results, since a statistically significant 
relationship is found between the inverse Mill´s ratio and debt.  
 
5. Discussion of Results  
The impact of financial deficit on debt variations in service SMEs (B=0.90911) is 
greater than in the context of large service firms (B=0.50172), manufacturing and 
construction SMEs (B=0.48091) as well as for manufacturing and construction large 
firms (B=0.39440). The results of the Chow test confirm these differences. In addition, 
the regression constant regarding the relationship between financial deficit and debt 
variations in service SMEs is not statistically significant, but it is not the case in any 
other type of firm. This empirical evidence indicates that recourse to debt by service 
SMEs is considerably more influenced by insufficient internal finance than what occurs 
in other types of firm.  
The relationships identified between determinants and debt in service SMEs and 
other types of firm allow us to draw various conclusions. Firstly, we find that service 
SMEs reduce recourse to debt in situations of low growth opportunities and high cash 
flow, which agrees with the forecasts of Pecking Order Theory. This result is not found 
for any other type of firm. Secondly, greater cash flow implies less recourse to debt in 
service SMEs and other types of firm, corroborating what is forecast by Pecking Order 
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Theory. However, the magnitude of that reduction in recourse to debt is greater in 
service SMEs than in other types of firm. The results of the Chow test confirm those 
differences. Thirdly, greater age contributes to reduced recourse to debt in service SMEs 
and large firms, and in manufacturing and construction SMEs, corroborating Pecking 
Order Theory. The magnitude of reduction in debt, as a consequence of greater age, is 
greater in service SMEs than in other types of firm. This result is also confirmed by the 
Chow test. Therefore, age is not a determinant of debt for large manufacturing and 
construction firms. Fourthly, situations of high growth opportunities and low cash flow 
contribute to increased recourse to debt in service SMEs and large firms, and in 
manufacturing and construction SMEs, corroborating what is forecast by Pecking Order 
Theory. However, the magnitude of the increase in debt is greater in service SMEs than 
in large service firms and manufacturing and construction SMEs, a situation that is 
confirmed by the results of the Chow test. As for large manufacturing and construction 
firms, we find that situations of high growth opportunities and low cash flow imply 
neither more nor less recourse to debt.  
The multiple empirical evidence obtained allows us to conclude that service SMEs 
turn more to debt as a function of financial deficit and high growth opportunities and 
low cash flow, and turn less to debt as a function of cash flow, age and situations of low 
growth opportunities and high cash flow than is the case in other types of firm. We can 
therefore conclude that capital structure decisions in service SMEs are closer to the 
forecasts of Pecking Order Theory than the capital structure decisions of other types of 
firm, and so we can accept the previously formulated hypothesis H1 as valid.  
The importance of internal finance in SME activity (Pettit and Singer, 1985; Ang 
1992; Scherr and Hulburt 2001; López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar, 2008; Ramalho 
and Silva 2009) seems to be particularly strong in service SMEs. This importance is 
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reinforced by the particular relevance of cash flow for the survival of service SMEs, and 
also by the fact that financial deficit contributes to diminishing the survival of service 
SMEs that does not occur in other types of firm. The conclusions of Franco and Haase 
(2010) that financing restrictions may affect SME survival seem to be particularly 
relevant in service SMEs. 
The smaller size of SMEs, and consequently greater probability of bankruptcy 
(Pettit and Singer, 1985; Ang, 1991), associated with higher level of intangible assets 
(Cruz-Ros et al., 2010), may decisively contribute to service SMEs to have particular 
difficulty in obtaining debt. Therefore, service SMEs may turn to debt only in cases of 
need, i.e., when internal funds are clearly insufficient to finance their activities. 
The empirical evidence obtained corroborates the conclusions of Cressy and 
Olofsson (1997) and Abor (2007), since service SMEs’ lower level of tangible assets 
compared to manufacturing and construction
8
, SMEs’ level of tangible assets may 
decisively contribute to increasing the problems of information asymmetry faced by 
service SMEs in the relationships with creditors, contributing to internal finance being 
their main source of funding.  
Regarding the applicability of the assumptions of Trade-Off Theory to the capital 
structure decisions of service SMEs and those of other types of firm, we find that their 
level of adjustment of actual debt level toward target debt ratio is lower (α=0.21880) 
than the level of adjustment verified in large service firms (α=0.40808), in 
manufacturing and construction SMEs (α=0.37069) as well as in manufacturing and 
construction large firms (α=0.52284). The results of the Chow test confirm the 
differences in the adjustments of actual debt level toward the target debt ratio between 
service SMEs and other types of firm.  
                                                 
8
 From the results presented in Table 2, we see that on average, the tangible assets of service SMEs are 
0.29778, while the tangible assets of manufacturing and construction SMEs are 0.34997. 
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With respect to the relationships between determinants and debt, the empirical 
evidence allows us to draw important conclusions regarding the applicability of the 
assumptions of Trade-Off Theory to the capital structure decisions of service SMEs and 
other types of firm. Firstly, greater profitability does not contribute to increased 
recourse to debt in service SMEs and other types of firm, which does not corroborate 
what is forecast by Trade-Off Theory, because firms do not take advantage of greater 
profitability to increase debt tax-shields, arising from greater level of debt. Secondly, 
greater growth opportunities, greater non-debt tax shields, and greater risk imply less 
recourse to debt by SMEs and large manufacturing and construction firms, results which 
are in accordance with Trade-Off Theory. In service SMEs, growth opportunities, non-
debt tax shields, and risk are not determinants of their level of debt. In large service 
firms, only non-debt tax shields are a determinant of debt, but growth opportunities and 
risk are not determinants of debt. Thirdly, higher effective tax rates contribute to greater 
recourse to debt by large service firms and large manufacturing and construction firms, 
these results corroborating the forecasts of Trade-Off Theory. Higher effective tax rates 
are not a determinant of debt in service SMEs and large service firms.  
Fourthly, greater size contributes to increased recourse to debt by service and 
manufacturing/construction SMEs, corroborating the forecasts of Trade-Off Theory, but 
it is not a determinant of debt in large service firms and large 
manufacturing/construction firms. In addition, greater tangibility of assets contributes to 
service SMEs, and large service as well as manufacturing/construction firms turning 
more to debt, these results agreeing with Trade-Off Theory. It stands out that size and 
asset tangibility are of greater relative importance for increased recourse to debt in 
service SMEs than in other types of firm, a situation confirmed by the results of the 
Chow test.  
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Contrary to our expectations, greater size and higher level of tangible assets are of 
greater relative importance for service SMEs turning to debt, compared to the case in 
other types of firm. Considering only relationships between size and debt, and between 
tangible assets and debt, we would conclude that the capital structure decisions of 
service SMEs are closer to the forecasts of Trade-Off Theory than the capital structure 
decisions of other types of firm. These results may arise from the importance of greater 
size and level of tangible assets to reduce the problems of information asymmetry, 
therefore creditors grant debt in more favourable terms to service SMEs. The marginal 
importance of size and tangible assets to obtain debt may be greater for service SMEs 
than for other types of firm. 
Service SMEs have a lower level adjustment of actual debt toward target debt ratio 
than is found in other types of firms. Additionally, greater growth opportunities, greater 
non-debt tax shields and greater risk do not imply less recourse to debt in service SMEs. 
Higher effective tax rates do not imply more recourse to debt in service SMEs, unlike 
what occurs in the majority of the situations in other types of firm.  
Although not for all determinants, the empirical evidence suggests that the capital 
structure decisions of service SMEs are further from the assumptions of Trade-Off 
Theory than the capital structure decisions of other types of firm, and so we can accept 
the previously formulated hypothesis H2 as partially valid.  
It stands out that service SMEs have lower speed of adjustment of the actual debt 
level toward target debt ratio than other types of firm. This result suggests the lower 
importance that the goal to reaching the target debt ratio has for service SMEs compared 
to the case in other types of firm. Contributing to these results are the smaller size and 
the lower levels of tangible assets of service SMEs that imply high transaction costs, 
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which may explain the lower speed of adjustment of actual level of debt toward the 
target debt ratio.  
Värlander and Julien (2010) conclude that personal relationships established with 
clients can be particularly important to increase performance in service firms. This 
important conclusion by the authors can be extended to the relationships between the 
owners/managers of service SMEs and creditors. Indeed, establishing trusting and long-
lasting relationships may be particularly important for reducing the information 
asymmetry between service SME owners/managers and creditors, contributing to lower 
transaction costs in obtaining debt. Therefore, service SMEs may increase the speed of 
adjustment of the actual level of debt toward target debt ratio.  
On the one hand, the fact that service SMEs do not reduce the level of debt as a 
function of greater growth opportunities, level of risk and non-debt tax shields, and do 
not increase the level of debt as a function of tax rate, shows that these firms are less 
concerned with a trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt compared to other 
types of firm. On the other hand, the fact that size and tangible assets are particularly 
relevant for service SMEs to obtain debt indicates that greater size and high level of 
tangible assets may be determinant for service SMEs to consider more effectively a 
trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt. 
The multiple empirical evidence obtained in this study clearly indicates that 
problems of information asymmetry between firm owners/managers and creditors can 
be particularly relevant in the case of service SMEs. Indeed, in these circumstances, as 
Elston and Audretsch (2009) conclude that firms with high information asymmetry 
associated with their activities may only resort to debt when internal finance is clearly 
insufficient.  
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Reed and Storrud-Barnes (2009) conclude that economies of scale and the power of 
the market may be particularly relevant for service firms being able to increase their 
performance. There may be an important connection between the conclusions of Reed 
and Storrud-Barnes (2009) and the empirical evidence obtained in this paper. Greater 
size and higher level of tangible assets may contribute to greater recourse to debt in 
service SMEs on particularly advantageous terms. When internal finance is insufficient, 
obtaining debt in advantageous terms may be fundamental for service SMEs being able 
to take advantage of the multiple investment opportunities arising, which allows to 
attain a economies of scale and market power, consequently increasing their 
performance. 
Hall et al. (2000) for British SMEs and Bhaird and Lucey (2009) for Irish SMEs 
conclude that differences between capital structure decisions in service and 
manufacturing SMEs are not significant. Identical conclusions are obtained by Cressy 
and Olofsson (1997) for Swedish SMEs, and by Abor (2007) for Ghanaian SMEs. 
Unlike the conclusions of other empirical studies, we find that the capital structure 
decisions of service SMEs differ considerably from those of other types of firm, such as 
SMEs and large firms in the manufacturing and construction industry. We also find that 
the capital structure decisions of service SMEs are different from those of large service 
firms. 
It is also important to mention that the capital structure decisions of service SMEs 
are closer to the assumptions of Pecking Order Theory, whereas the structure decisions 
of large manufacturing and construction firms are closer to the assumptions of Trade-
Off Theory. This difference in the financing behaviour between service SMEs and large 
manufacturing and construction firms may be due to the effects of size (i.e., small 
versus large firms) and tangible assets (service firms versus manufacturing and 
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construction industries), reinforcing the importance of these two determinants in 
explaining differences between the capital structure decisions of service SMEs and 
those of other types of firm.  
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
Using four research samples: i) 610 SMEs, ii) 126 large service firms; iii) 679 
manufacturing and construction SMEs; and iv) 132 large manufacturing and 
construction firms, and resorting to the two-step estimation process, this paper analyses 
if the capital structure decisions of service SMEs are different from those of other types 
of firm.  
The multiple empirical evidence obtained allow us to conclude that the capital 
structure decisions of service SMEs are different from those of other types of firm. 
Firstly, variations of debt in service SMEs are found to be considerably more influenced 
by situations of financial deficit than the debt variations in other types of firm. In 
addition, compared to other types of firms, we find that greater relative importance of 
cash flow, age and situations of low growth opportunities and high cash flow for 
reduced recourse to debt in service SMEs. Additionally, the situations of high growth 
opportunities and low cash flow have greater importance for increased recourse to debt 
in service SMEs. These results clearly indicate that the capital structure decisions of 
service SMEs are closer to the forecasts of Pecking Order Theory than are the capital 
structure decisions of other types of firm.  
Secondly, the speed of adjustment of actual level of debt toward target debt ratio is 
lower in service SMEs than in other types of firm. This result shows that service SMEs 
face higher transaction costs in obtaining debt than other types of firm. Furthermore, 
service SMEs do not decrease the level of debt as a function of greater growth 
33 
 
opportunities, greater non-debt tax shields and greater risk. However, service SMEs do 
do not increase the level of debt as a function of higher effective tax rates, unlike what 
occurs in large service, manufacturing and construction firms as well as in 
manufacturing and construction SMEs for some of the determinants named above. 
Thirdly, size and asset tangibility are of greater relative importance for greater level 
of debt for service SMEs compared to the case of other types of firm. This result allows 
us to conclude that size and tangible assets are particularly important for lessening 
problems of information asymmetry in the relationships between the owners/managers 
of service SMEs and creditors. Additionally, given that greater size and higher level of 
tangible assets contribute to reduced information asymmetry in relationships between 
service SME owners/managers and creditors, service SMEs can begin to consider more 
effectively in their strategies to reach the target debt ratio, which implies that firms 
balance the benefits and costs of debt. 
The multiple empirical evidence obtained in this study allow us to make various 
contributions to the literature on SME capital structure in general, and to capital 
structure in service SMEs in particular. The results show that the capital structure 
decisions of service SMEs are considerably different from those of other types of firm. 
The empirical evidence obtained here shows that service SMEs resort to debt more as a 
consequence of insufficient internal finance, and less with the aim of attaining a target 
debt ratio that balances the benefits and costs of debt. The capital structure decisions of 
service SMEs are closer to the suppositions of Pecking Order Theory, and further 
removed from those of Trade-Off Theory, than the capital structure decisions of other 
types of firm. 
The paper also makes a relevant theoretical contribution to the literature on SME 
capital structure in general, and service SMEs in particular: size and tangible assets can 
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be particularly relevant for firms that face problems of information asymmetry, as may 
be the case with service SMEs. Consequently, greater size and higher level of tangible 
assets allow service SMEs being able to consider more effectively in their capital 
structure decisions a trade-off between the benefits and cost of debt, and not resorting 
almost exclusively to debt to cover insufficiencies of internal finance. In other words, 
size and tangible assets are important determinants for service SMEs, particularly 
affected by problems of information asymmetry, do not consider only the assumptions 
of Pecking Order Theory, being able to consider also those of Trade-Off Theory in their 
capital structure decisions.  
The empirical evidence obtained in this paper allows us to make suggestions for 
policy-makers and the owners/managers of service SMEs. Given the importance of 
service SMEs in Europe in general, and in Portugal in particular, to policy-makers we 
suggest the creation of lines of credit especially directed for SMEs that are financial and 
economically sustainable, but facing obstacles in obtaining debt. The creation of lines of 
credit would allow service SMEs to take advantage of the multiple investment 
opportunities that in turn would contribute to promote firms’ economies of scale, and 
consequently to increased employment and economic growth.  
To the owners/managers of service SMEs we suggest to establish trusting, long-
lasting relationships with creditors, so as to lessen problems of information asymmetry, 
which contributes to obtain debt on more advantageous terms.  
Given that firm´s growth may influence funding needs, this study has the limitation 
regarding the absence of the analysis of the applicability of the Pecking Order Theory 
and Trade-off Theory as a function of the growth levels of the service SMEs and other 
types of firm. For future researches, we suggest to study the applicability of 
representative models of Pecking Order Theory and Trade-Off Theory to the capital 
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structure decisions of service SMEs and other types of firm considering the firms’ levels 
of growth. 
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APPENDIX A: Trade – Off Theory Model - LSDVC (2005) Estimator  
 
Table A1: Trade- Off Theory Model - LSDVC (2005) Estimator  
 Dependent Variable: Di,t 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms  Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Independent variables     
Di,t-1 0.83421*** 
(0.07882) 
0.56172*** 
(0.06019) 
0.65162*** 
(0.05516) 
0.51108*** 
(0.05314) 
PROFi,t -0.85152*** 
(0.11334) 
-0.51018*** 
(0.06541) 
-0.65160*** 
(0.09445) 
-0.37091*** 
(0.04919) 
SIZEi,t 0.07617*** 
(0.02626) 
0.03483* 
(0.01770) 
0.05718*** 
(0.01309) 
0.00988 
(0.01445) 
TANGi,t 0.45612*** 
(0.12681) 
0.18919** 
(0.09762) 
0.21909*** 
(0.07679) 
0.13919* 
(0.07018) 
GOi,t -0.01408 
(0.05181) 
0.02056 
(0.07142) 
-0.03981** 
(0.01912) 
-0.07909*** 
(0.02398) 
NDTSi,t 0.02718 
(0.12871) 
-0.21012*** 
(0.05671) 
-0.29667*** 
(0.09559) 
-0.32019*** 
(0.09382) 
ETRi,t 0.00453 
(0.021061) 
0.067812*** 
(0.02171) 
-0.01299 
(0.03617) 
0.08108*** 
(0.02284) 
EVOLi,t 0.01415 
(0.02718) 
0.008905 
(0.00987) 
-0.02109*** 
(0.00901) 
-0.02223*** 
(0.00443) 
λi,t -18.7762*** 
(4.2171) 
-12.6563*** 
(3.4092) 
-17.6512*** 
(3.5901) 
-14.0201*** 
(4.1451) 
Firms  534 116 567 113 
Observations 3097 685 3258 656 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 3. The estimates include time 
dummy variables, but not shown.  
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Table 1: Sample Description 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Incumbent firms in all period 1999 – 2006 468 112 506 107 
Firms entering in the period 1999 –2006  66 4 61 6 
Firms exiting in the period 1999-2006 76 10 112 19 
Total Firms 610 126 679 132 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms Other SMEs  Other Large Firms 
Variable N Mean S.D. N Mean S. D. N Mean S.D N Mean S.D: 
ΔLEVi,t 3933 174341 965121 851 189182 987161 4348 187901 1011299 872 180067 997651 
FDi,t 3933 -240912 961521 851 -161820 988774 4348 -389184 1490198 872 -140921 871821 
Di,t 3933 0.64503 0.17661 851 0.67490 0.19714 4348 0.66149 0.18893 872 0.70112 0.20117 
CFi,t 3933 0.06819 0.10116 851 0.07413 0.11998 4348 0.04895 0.08113 872 0.06891 0.09668 
AGEi,t 3933 2.70330 0.70182 851 2.81828 0.75162 4348 2.79812 0.73421 872 2.83717 0.77710 
HGOLCFi,t 3933 0.07616 0.27881 851 0.058919 0.20981 4348 0.06172 0.24516 872 0.05561 0.19781 
LGOHCFi,t 3933 -0.04891 0.18912 851 -0.05616 0.20182 4348 -0.03511 0.16172 872 -0.02871 0.14152 
PROFi,t 3933 0.05211 0.08089 851 0.05122 0.07944 4348 0.05291 0.08251 872 0.05091 0.07871 
SIZEi,t 3933 16.5361 2.41321 851 17.9485 2.88990 4348 16.5781 2.38981 872 18.0123 2.93172 
TANGi,t 3933 0.29778 0.21899 851 0.30918 0.22121 4348 0.34997 0.23996 872 0.37719 0.25712 
GOi,t 3933 0.08981 0.32777 851 0.04717 0.25667 4348 0.07654 0.27013 872 0.04205 0.23916 
NDTSi,t 3933 0.03749 0.03311 851 0.04018 0.04281 4348 0.04654 0.03781 872 0.04559 0.04609 
ETRi,t 3933 0.41821 1.58929 851 0.44681 1.60812 4348 0.41414 1.56712 872 0.46717 1.63421 
EVOLi,t 3933 1.64564 2.89843 851 1.56717 2.80198 4348 1.40911 2.5989 872 1.37812 2.57812 
 
Table 3: Survival Analysis – Impact of Financial Deficit on Debt Variations - Pecking Order 
Theory – Model I 
 Dependent Variable: Pr(δi,t=1) 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Independent variables     
FDi,t -0.000007*** 
(0.0000002) 
-0.0000001 
(0.0000002) 
-0.000002 
(0.0000002) 
0.000001 
(0.000001) 
CONS 0.00417*** 
(0.00103) 
0.05161*** 
(0.00415) 
0.06667*** 
(0.00871) 
0.05142*** 
(0.00910) 
Pseudo R
2 
0.16162 0.03421 0.03019 0.02771 
Log Likelihood -98.10 -86.44 -81.17 -90.12 
Firms 610 126 679 132 
Observations 3933 851 4348 872 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 3. The estimates include time 
dummy variables, but not shown.  
 
Table 4: Impact of Financial Deficit on Debt Variations - Pecking Order Theory – Model I 
 Dependent Variable: ΔLEV 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Independent variables     
FDi,t 0.90911*** 
(0.08002) 
0.50172*** 
(0.06571) 
0.48091*** 
(0.07172) 
0.39440*** 
(0.06151) 
λi,t -16.091*** 
(2.09213) 
-12.819*** 
(1.56109) 
-15.104*** 
(1.8718) 
-13.876*** 
(1.76201) 
CONS 54891 
(52910) 
159145*** 
(54091) 
163409*** 
(53907) 
187012*** 
(56118) 
F(N(0.1))
 
157.12 123.01*** 117.23*** 108.90*** 
R
2
 0.72839 0.56121 0.51447 0.46712 
Firms 534 116 567 113 
Observations 3575 798 3779 764 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 3. The estimates include time 
dummy variables, but not shown.  
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Table 5: Chow Test – Impact of Financial Deficit on Debt Variations - Pecking Order Theory – 
Model I 
 Service SMEs versus Large Service Firms Service SMEs versus Other SMEs Service SMEs versus Other Large Firmss 
Independent variables    
FDi,t 20.90*** 21.34*** 24.56*** 
Notes: 1. Probabilities in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level.  
 
Table 6: Survival Analysis – Determinants of Debt - Pecking Order Theory – Model II 
 Dependent Variable: Pr(δi,t=1) 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Independent variables     
CFi,t 0.60561*** 
(0.08192) 
0.17162** 
(0.08451) 
0.21617*** 
(0.05918) 
0.10923** 
(0.05410) 
AGEi,t 0.21098*** 
(0.06172) 
0.07182* 
(0.03644) 
0.10821** 
(0.05319) 
-0.01872 
(0.04813) 
HGOLCFi,t -0.02731 
(0.04516) 
0.01919 
(0.04892) 
-0.01823 
(0.06173) 
0.00918 
(0.02744) 
LGOHCFi,t 0.01824 
(0.05671) 
0.02818 
(0.05889) 
-0.02812 
(0.03008) 
-0.01888 
(0.03499) 
CONS 0.00837 
(0.01775) 
0.017162 
(0.028381) 
0.00991 
(0.01848) 
0.03182* 
(0.01551) 
Pseudo R
2 
0.15517 0.10082 0.11891 0.07661 
Log Likelihood -112.10 -102.87 -106.33 -97.67 
Firms  610 126 679 132 
Observations 3933 851 4348 872 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 3. The estimates include time 
dummy variables, but not shown.  
 
Table 7: Determinants of Debt - Pecking Order Theory – Model II 
 Dependent Variable: Di,t 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Independent variables     
CFi,t -0.81734*** 
(0.15161) 
-0.46712*** 
(0.12843) 
-0.30182** 
(0.14538) 
-0.18781** 
(0.09332) 
AGEi,t -0.08812*** 
(0.01784) 
-0.04998** 
(0.02419) 
-0.02091* 
(0.01197) 
0.01201 
(0.02189) 
HGOLCFi,t 0.09812*** 
(0.02810) 
0.05120*** 
(0.01671) 
0.04891*** 
(0.01458) 
0.00891 
(0.02515) 
LGOHCFi,t -0.06718*** 
(0.015462) 
-0.02066 
(0.01982) 
-0.02797 
(0.02568) 
0.01562 
(0.03899) 
λi,t -11.4938*** 
(2.05169) 
-12.6670*** 
(2.16715) 
-15.4312*** 
(3.9173) 
-14.8182*** 
(4.0182) 
CONS 0.01154 
(0.01348) 
0.02191* 
(0.01047) 
0.01341 
(0.01216) 
0.05162*** 
(0.01516) 
R
2 
0.51527 0.46781 0.41929 0.27172 
F(N(0.1)) 111.90*** 103.34*** 102.08*** 81.12*** 
LM Test 156.90*** 142.05*** 150.09*** 134.86*** 
Hausman Test 57.56*** 49.89*** 60.10*** 52.33*** 
Firms  534 116 567 113 
Observations 3575 798 3779 764 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 3. The estimates include time 
dummy variables, but not shown.  
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Table 8: Chow Test – Determinants of Debt - Pecking Order Theory – Model II 
 Service SMEs versus Large Service Firms Service SMEs versus Other SMEs Service SMEs versus Other Large Firmss 
Independent variables    
CFi,t 14.49*** 
(0.0000) 
16.71*** 
(0.0000) 
22.79*** 
(0.0000) 
AGEi,t 13.13*** 
(0.0000) 
17.05*** 
(0.0000) 
20.14*** 
(0.0000) 
HGOLCFi,t 12.27*** 
(0.0000) 
12.83*** 
(0.0000) 
18.66*** 
(0.0000) 
LGOHCFi,t 15.90*** 
(0.0000) 
15.55*** 
(0.0000) 
16.14*** 
(0.0000) 
Global Difference 14.86*** 
(0.0000) 
16.82*** 
(0.0000) 
20.44*** 
(0.0000) 
Notes: 1. Probabilities in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level.  
 
Table 9: Survival Analysis – Trade-Off Theory Model 
 Dependent Variable: Pr(δi,t=1) 
 Service SMEs Large Service Firms Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Independent variables     
PROFi,t 0.63412*** 
(0.09019) 
0.27381*** 
(0.51629) 
0.45217*** 
(0.07165) 
0.08712* 
(0.04498) 
SIZEi,t 0.04944*** 
(0.01506) 
0.03982** 
(0.01875) 
0.11919*** 
(0.03621) 
0.10928** 
(0.05418) 
TANGi,t 0.05512 
(0.10823) 
0.05331 
(0.11008) 
0.36171*** 
(0.08990) 
0.30442*** 
(0.07680) 
GOi,t 0.06511* 
(0.03450) 
0.08918** 
(0.04411) 
0.04154 
(0.07616) 
0.09412** 
(0.04657) 
NDTSi,t 0.00616 
(0.01981) 
0.01828 
(0.02554) 
-0.00978 
(0.02003) 
0.01450 
(0.03811) 
ETRi,t -0.01848 
(0.02901) 
-0.01125 
(0.03879) 
-0.02172 
(0.05142) 
-0.03008 
(0.06169) 
EVOLi,t -0.06172*** 
(0.01829) 
-0.04132** 
(0.02014) 
-0.02812*** 
(0.01122) 
-0.01181 
(0.01165) 
CONS 0.01313 
(0.02182) 
0.00987 
(0.01761) 
0.01242 
(0.02026) 
0.01451 
(0.02880) 
Pseudo R
2 
0.34152 0.32911 0.38918 0.36631 
Log Likelihood -115.95 -113.40 109.01 106.77 
Firms  610 126 679 132 
Observations 3933 851 4348 872 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 3. The estimates include time 
dummy variables, but not shown.  
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Table 10: Trade of Theory Model – GMM System (1998) Estimator 
 Dependent Variable: Di,t 
 Service SMEs Large SMEs Other SMEs Other Large Firms 
Independent variables     
Di,t-1 0.78120*** 
(0.06718) 
0.59192*** 
(0.05416) 
0.62931*** 
(0.05844) 
0.47716*** 
(0.04990) 
PROFi,t -0.91432*** 
(0.09018) 
-0.57818*** 
(0.06712) 
-0.62461*** 
(0.08172) 
-0.43129*** 
(0.05449) 
SIZEi,t 0.08198*** 
(0.02923) 
0.02911 
(0.02844) 
0.04891** 
(0.01550) 
0.01122 
(0.01874) 
TANGi,t 0.39525*** 
(0.08917) 
0.21456** 
(0.10604) 
0.23081*** 
(0.07189) 
0.12911** 
(0.06357) 
GOi,t -0.01516 
(0.07817) 
0.01781 
(0.06992) 
-0.03481** 
(0.01138) 
-0.07746*** 
(0.02407) 
NDTSi,t 0.03424 
(0.10889) 
-0.17821** 
(0.08615) 
-0.26931*** 
(0.08918) 
-0.37844*** 
(0.11423) 
ETRi,t 0.00771 
(0.02668) 
0.06171** 
(0.03012) 
-0.01056 
(0.03135) 
0.08441*** 
(0.02435) 
EVOLi,t 0.00982 
(0.01223) 
0.00574 
(0.00913) 
-0.01818*** 
(0.00457) 
-0.02551*** 
(0.00511) 
λi,t -15.6741*** 
(3.1029) 
-13.0071*** 
(2.87104) 
-16.9944*** 
(3.2281) 
-17.6131*** 
(3.6178) 
CONS 0.06712** 
(0.03370) 
0.04123* 
(0.02277) 
0.02371 
(0.03445) 
0.01806 
(0.02878) 
F(N(0,1)) 56.90*** 60.19*** 64.59*** 69.07*** 
Hansen (N(0,1)) 56.10 51.34 61.90 57.01 
m1 (N(0,1)) -5.87*** -6.07*** -5.61*** -5.94*** 
m2 (N(0,1)) 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.12 
Firms  534 116 567 113 
Observations 3097 685 3258 656 
Notes: 1. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 3. The estimates include time 
dummy variables, but not shown.  
Table 11: Chow Test – Trade – Off Theory Model  
 Service SMEs versus Large Service Firms Service SMEs versus Other SMEs Service SMEs versus Other Large Firmss 
Independent variables    
Di,t-1 12.10*** 
(0.0000) 
10.96*** 
(0.0000) 
15.27*** 
(0.0000) 
PROFi,t 11.68*** 
(0.0000) 
9.87*** 
(0.0000) 
16.02*** 
(0.0000) 
SIZEi,t 16.84*** 
(0.0000) 
13.22*** 
(0.0000) 
17.14*** 
(0.0000) 
TANGi,t 8.35*** 
(0.0000) 
7.91*** 
(0.0000) 
9.82*** 
(0.0000) 
GOi,t 0.89 
(0.798) 
8.10*** 
(0.0000) 
15.18*** 
(0.0000) 
NDTSi,t 9.33*** 
(0.0000) 
11.44*** 
(0.0000) 
14.01*** 
(0.0000) 
ETRi,t 10.41*** 
(0.0000) 
1.21 
(0.616) 
11.99*** 
(0.0000) 
EVOLi,t 0.61 
(0.884) 
11.77*** 
(0.0000) 
13.33*** 
(0.0000) 
Global Difference 11.51*** 
(0.0000) 
12.33*** 
(0.0000) 
14.92*** 
(0.0000) 
Notes: 1. Probabilities in parenthesis. 2. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
